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ISSUE ADVOCACY: IF IT CANNOT BE
REGULATED WHEN IT IS LEAST VALUABLE, IT
CANNOT BE REGULATED WHEN IT IS MOST
VALUABLE
Kirk L. Jowers+
It used to be that the preferred antidote for the "danger[s] flowing
from speech" was "more speech, not enforced silence."' This is no
longer the case. Campaign finance reformers, as the media loves to call
them, are alarmed at the ever-increasing amount of political speech.
They loathe the hundreds of advertisements shown across America that
praise and criticize public officials and candidates for their positions on
issues of public importance but avoid express words of advocacy as established by Buckley v. Valeo2 and its progeny. Campaign finance reformers bemoan that the sponsors of these advertisements seek to influence elections, but because these communications do not fall within the
"express advocacy" standard, they remain free from federal contribution
limits and prohibitions and are not subject to any reporting and disclosure requirements. Regardless of the sponsors' motives, these advertisements, as political speech, are the most constitutionally protected
communications in our democracy. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court and a wide variety of lower courts have repeatedly decreed
that government may only narrowly regulate express advocacy-and not
issue advocacy-so that would-be speakers are subject to a clear unambiguous standard.
Unfortunately, campaign finance reformers, and at times the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) and state election agencies, remain undeterred by the First Amendment.3 These groups continually seek new le+ B.A., University of Utah, 1992; J.D., Harvard University, 1995; Attorney, Wiley, Rein &
Fielding, Washington, D.C. Mr. Jowers advises clients on federal, state, and local campaign finance laws, government ethics requirements, lobbying registration, and related government affairs issues. Mr. Jowers served as Deputy General Counsel to the Advisory Commission on
Electronic Commerce, and as a clerk for Judge Stephen H. Anderson of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit and for Judge Dee V. Benson of the U.S. District Court, District of Utah.
The author expresses his appreciation to attorney Caleb Bums, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, for his
significant research, writing, and editorial assistance with this article.
1. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

2.

424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).

3.

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution mandates that "Congress shall
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gal means to regulate or eradicate political speech. A currently popular
innovation-found in several pending federal bills, Vice-President
Gore's campaign finance proposal, and the Committee for Economic
Development's campaign finance recommendations-regulates issue advocacy with bright-line rules that specify time periods in which otherwise
protected speech loses its First Amendment protection. These federal
bills and their state counterparts are attractive because the bright-line
rules clearly specify the time periods in which certain images and language will be regulated. Admittedly, such clarity completely eliminates
any vagueness concerns. Whatever gains these regulations achieve, however, are lost because they are overly broad and therefore, encroach unconstitutionally upon free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
I. THE FRENZY To REGULATE ISSUE ADVOCACY

Would-be reformers find the stringency of First Amendment protections on political speech almost unbearable. They view "issue ads" (critics generally use quotation marks around "issue advertisements" to connote that these advertisements are not really about issues, but about
influencing elections) as clearly designed efforts to circumvent the federal election laws and influence the outcome of selected races.4 In fact,
the sponsors and beneficiaries of many of these advertisements often
confirm reformers' worst fears by proudly proclaiming that the advermake no law... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. Fred Wertheimer, President of Democracy 21, a public policy organization,
wrote:
Vice President Al Gore and Gov. George W. Bush and their presidential campaigns are living a lie. The lie is this: that the TV ads now being run in presidential battleground states across America are political party "issue ads." In fact,
everyone-and I mean everyone-knows that these ads are presidential campaign ads being run for the unequivocal purpose of directly influencing the presidential election.
As such, the "issue ads" are illegal, because, among other things, they are being
financed with tens of millions of dollars of soft-money contributions that the law
says cannot be used to influence a federal election.
Fred Wertheimer, Gore, Bush, and the Big Lie, WASH. POST, July 24, 2000, at A23. David
L. Hunter, campaign manager for Senator Max Baucus, commented on the National Right
to Work Committee's issue ads that criticized Senator Baucus and more than a half dozen
other Senators, and complained that "[tjhis is totally about influencing the outcome of the
election." Eliza Newlin Carney, Air Strikes, 28 NAT'L J. 1313, 1315 (1996). FEC General
Counsel Lawrence M. Noble commented that: "It is very easy to write these ads and do
these commercials without using those magic words, but they are very clearly campaign
ads...." Id. at 1315.
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tisements have achieved the goal of influencing an election.5 The Fourth
Circuit explained, however, that regardless of a sponsor's intent and/or
the advertisement's impact, only communications expressly supporting a
candidate constitute "express advocacy."6 More specifically, the court
pointedly noted that communications designed to influence an election,
but not containing express advocacy, constitute "issue advocacy." 7 Consequently, political parties and private groups continue to saturate radio
and television airwaves across the country with issue-oriented advertisements that often praise or disparage a candidate.8 In some congressional
districts, unlimited and undisclosed funds spent on issue broadcasts and
mailers exceed the funds spent by the candidates themselves.
This explosion of unregulated speech has placed increasing demands
on government to regulate the timing of issue advertisements, enforce

5. Senator Bob Dole, in commenting on a 60-second Republican National Committee issue ad that never mentioned the presidential election but devoted 56 seconds to his
biography, quipped that the ad "never says that I'm running for President [but] I hope[d]
that [was] fairly obvious, since [I was] the only one in the picture." Adam Clymer, System
Governing Election Spending Found in Shambles, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1996, at Al.
The posterchild organization of 527 infamy in the 2000 presidential campaign was "Republicans for Clean Air." This group, led by George W. Bush supporter Sam Wyly,
launched a $2.5 million issue ad campaign against GOP presidential candidate John
McCain in the form of criticizing Senator McCain's environmental record. "Mr. Wyly said
that 'of course' he hoped the commercials would benefit Mr. Bush .. " Richard W. Stevenson with Richard P6rez-Pefia, Wealthy Texan Says He Bought Anti-McCain Ads, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2000, at Al.
6. North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 708 (4th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1156 (2000).
7. Id.
8. Professor David B. Magelby studied the scope and impact of outside issue advocacy efforts in the 2000 presidential primaries. He summarized his research as follows:
The 2000 presidential nomination, with no incumbent running, held the possibility of interested groups and individuals applying the techniques of issue advocacy not only to influence the selection of the nominees, but also to set the
agenda for the remainder of the campaign cycle.
The amount of issue advocacy in the 2000 primaries exceeded the amount of
independent expenditures in past presidential primaries. It was also focused
primarily on the candidates, rather than issues, with 62% either supporting or attacking a presidential candidate.
DAVID B. MAGELBY, GETTING INSIDE THE OUTSIDE CAMPAIGN 1, 9 (2000).
According to a study conducted by the Annenberg Public Policy Center, "more than
two dozen organizations engaged in issue advocacy during the 1995-1996 election cycle, at
an estimated total expense of $135 million to $150 million." DEBORAH BECK ET AL.,
ISSUE ADVOCACY ADVERTISING DURING THE 1996 CAMPAIGN 3 (1997). A study of the
1999-2000 election cycle by the Annenberg Public Policy Center estimates that more than
$342 million has been or will be spent on issue advocacy. See Issue Ads @ APPC (last
modified Sept. 20, 2000) <http://appcpenn.org/issueads/estimate.htm>.
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more strictly a broader definition of what constitutes express advocacy,
and/or, at a minimum, disclose the sponsoring organizations and funding
sources of issue advocacy. 9 These "grim efforts" to regulate issue advertisements "will inevitably trench unacceptably far upon current conceptions of freedom of political speech.""' Examples of such efforts that may
trench unacceptably far include the "delimited time period,"" "blackout
period," 2 and "name or likeness"3 approaches.
The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1999 ("ShaysMeehan")"' is perhaps the best-known recent example of the express advocacy approach. This federal legislation attempted to regulate as "express advocacy" all communications that:
[R]efer to one or more clearly identified candidates in a paid
advertisement that is transmitted through radio or television
within 60 calendar days preceding the date of an election of the
candidate and that appears in the State in which the election is
occurring, except that with respect to a candidate for the office
of Vice President or President, the time period is within 60 calendar days preceding the date of the general election.'"
Shays-Meehan was never passed into law, 6 but its legacy survives in the
form of bills pending in Congress and a proposal by the Democratic
presidential candidate.

9. See, e.g., Dollars and Democracy: A Blueprint for Campaign Finance Reform
(visited Aug. 20, 2000) <http://www.abcny.org/dollar.html> ("The explosive rise of socalled issue advertising threatens several important values of our campaign finance system.").
10, Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 663, 688 (1997).
11.
GLEN MORAMARCO,
REGULATING
ELECTIONEERING:
DISTINGUISHING
BETWEEN "EXPRESS ADVOCACY" & "ISSUE ADVOCACY" 14 (Brennan Ctr. for Justice

Campaign Fin. Reform Series, 1998) (on file with Catholic University Law Review).
12. Allison R. Hayward, When Does an Advertisement About Issues Become an "Issues Ad"?, 49 CATH.U. L. REV. 63, 78 (1999).
13. Richard E. Levy, Defining Express Advocacy for Purposes of Campaign Finance
Reporting and Disclosure Laws, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 90, 111 (1998).
14. H.R. REP. NO. 106-297, pt. 1, at 21 (1999).
15. Id. at 26. Ironically, Shays-Meehan would make it illegal, for example, for New
York University School of Law's Brennan Center to pay for a television advertisement
within a few days of a vote on the legislation if the vote was within 60 days of an election.
16. See Helen Dewar, Campaign Finance Bill is Scuttled in the Senate, WASH. POST,
Oct. 20,1999, at Al; see also generally H.R. REP. NO. 106-297.
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I. THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT AS INTERPRETED BY
BUCKLEY V. VALEO

Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971"7 (FECA
or Act) due to mounting concerns about wealthy challengers and rising
campaign costs. The Act set limits on campaign costs and bolstered federal disclosure and reporting requirements. In 1974, Congress passed the
FECA amendments in order to stem potential corruption of federal office holders through the financing of their political campaigns after the
fundraising abuses by candidates and party committees emerged in the
Watergate scandal. The 1974 FECA amendments established the most
comprehensive campaign finance regulatory scheme ever enacted. Less
than two years later, and before the law took effect, the Supreme Court,
in Buckley v. Valeo, struck down many of FECA's provisions as unconstitutional restraints of protected free speech rights." Specifically, the
Court struck down the Act's limits on individual, candidate, and PAC
expenditures because they did not serve a government interest strong
enough to justify abridging First Amendment rights.' 9 In striking down
the expenditure limitations, upholding the contribution limitations,1
and reinterpreting the reporting and disclosure requirements,22 the Court
highlighted a problem that would vex proponents of campaign finance
reform for decades after Buckley: the interplay between the overbreadth
and vagueness doctrines.23 Courts employ both doctrines as tools of constitutional analysis to assess the specificity of statutes. Thus, in order for
a campaign finance reform measure to survive vagueness and overbreadth challenges, it must provide a clear, bright-line standard. The
measure cannot be drawn so broadly that it encompasses nonelectoral
political issue advocacy.

17. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1994).
18. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). The Court also upheld a
significant portion of the law. Thus, it held that FECA's contribution limits to candidates,
political action committees (PACs), and political parties could remain intact because they
served a "weighty" government interest of preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption. Id. at 25-29, 58. In addition, the Court reinterpreted the Act's reporting and
disclosure requirements so that they too could serve the same government interest. See id.
at 74-84.
19. See id. at 45, 51, 55, 58.
20. See id. at 39-51.
21. See id. at 24-35.
22. See id. at 60-84.
23. See id. at 61, 76-79, 82.
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III. THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF POLITICAL SPEECH AND PROXIMITY
REGULATION

The Supreme Court has historically treated regulations of political
speech, especially those that limit speech during a political campaign,
with extreme skepticism. The Court, in Eu v. San Francisco County
Democratic Central Committee,24 documented the myriad of court decisions expressing this skepticism when it addressed a state's prohibition
on primary endorsements by political parties:
The ban directly affects speech which 'is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.' Williams
v. Rhodes, [393 U.S. 23 (1968)]. We have recognized repeatedly
that 'debate on the qualifications of candidates [is] integral to
the operation of the system of government established by our
Constitution.' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam); see also NAACP v.. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886, 913 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). Indeed, the First
Amendment "has its fullest and most urgent application" to
speech uttered during a campaign for political office. Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971); see also Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1996). Free discussion about candidates for public office is no less critical before a primary than
before a general election. Cf Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735
(1974); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314 (1941). In both instances, the
"election campaign is a means of disseminating ideas as well as
attaining political office." Illinois Bd. of Elections [v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979)].25
Likewise, Buckley reminded us that the discussion of public issues and
debate on candidate qualifications is integral to the operation of government as established by the Constitution. The Buckley Court noted
that "[t]he First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order 'to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. ",,26
More specifically, the Court proclaimed that all regulations impinging
political expression burden "core First Amendment rights of political ex-

24. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
25. Id. at 222-23.
26. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
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pression., 27 Any restriction of such core speech must, therefore, satisfy
the highly demanding standard applicable to statutes that transgress fundamental Constitutional values of strict judicial scrutiny. To withstand
strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
governmental interest. Despite this rigorous standard, Buckley permitted regulation of campaign-related communications and expenditures involving express advocacy; but granted independent issue advocacy full
freedom from government regulation. 28 Furthermore, Mills v. Alabama,9
and cases applying Mills, placed an even heavier legal burden on those
seeking to regulate political speech at the last minute." Analyzed together, Buckley and Mills provide two complimentary bases upon which
proposals that seek to limit issue advocacy near elections should be
found unconstitutional.
A. Buckley v. Valeo: The Creation of the "Express" Versus "Issue"
Advocacy Distinction
The Buckley opinion essentially established a three-tiered structure for
regulating campaign expenditures: coordinated expenditures and contributions (limits and prohibitions); independent expenditures (disclosure
and reporting requirements); and independent issue advocacy (no regulation). Buckley set a bright-line that limits government regulation of
political speech to "express advocacy" of "the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate for federal office."'" The Court cautioned
that a strict approach was necessary because "the distinction between
discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election
or defeat of
32
candidates may often dissolve in practical application.
The Buckley Court then explained "express advocacy" in two different
contexts. First, in striking down FECA's $1,000 independent expenditure limit, the Court stated that because the discussion of political issues
is so closely linked to the discussion of political candidates, the Act's expenditure limits that relate to clearly identified candidates are unconstitutionally vague.33 The Court feared that the expenditure limits would be
27. Id. at 44-45.
28. Id. at 22-23.
29. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
30. See id. at 220 (criticizing the Alabama law because it allows people to "hurl their
campaign charges up to the last minute of the day before the election" and prohibits an
"adequate reply to these charges").
31. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
32. Id. at 42.
33.

See id. at 39-43.
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applied to constrain constitutionally protected political issue discus14
sions. The Court continued by saying that in order to redress the expenditure limitation's vagueness difficulties, the Act "must be construed
to apply only to expenditures for communications that in express terms
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office."35
Second, the Buckley Court discussed "express advocacy" with respect
to FECA's reporting and disclosure provisions.36 The Court found a
vagueness problem with these reporting and disclosure requirements because they could unconstitutionally chill issue discussion when applied to
every person who made a contribution or expenditure for the purpose of
influencing a federal election.37 The Court remedied this problem by referring to its discussion of the $1,000 independent expenditure limitation
and limited FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements to communications "that expressly
advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identi38
fied candidate.,
The Court reaffirmed the vitality of the "express advocacy" requirement in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc.3 In Massachusetts
Citizens For Life, the Supreme Court declared that Buckley "adopted the
'express advocacy' requirement to distinguish discussion of issues and
candidates from more pointed exhortations to vote for particular persons."4 " The Court then held that the statute at issue could only
be found
41
advocacy.,
"express
to
limited
was
reach
its
if
constitutional
In attempting to protect the rights of citizens to speak out on issues
and apply the express advocacy test established in Buckley-as further
clarified in Massachusetts Citizens For Life-all but one federal circuit
court has strictly and literally interpreted the "express advocacy" standard to require the use of specific "magic words," such as "vote for" or

34. See id. at 41-42 (noting that the Court of Appeals erred when thinking that the
statute's construction completely eliminated vagueness).
35. Id. at 44.
36. See id. at 75-83.
37. See id. at 76-82 (discussing and recognizing the statute's "serious problems of
vagueness").
38. Id. at 80.
39. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
40. Id. at 249.
41. Id. at 251; cf West Virginians for Life v. Smith, 960 F. Supp. 1036,1039 (S.D. W.
Va. 1996) ("It is clear from the holdings in Buckley and its progeny that the Supreme
Court has made a definite distinction between express advocacy, which generally can be
regulated, and issue advocacy, which generally cannot be regulated.").
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"elect," as a mandatory prerequisite to finding "express advocacy. 4 2
Likewise, courts that have addressed state laws regulating issue advocacy
have also resisted a more encompassing approach. 43 This bright-line approach "may err on the side of permitting things that affect the election
process, but at all costs avoids restricting, in any way, discussion of public
issues., 44 In short, the "express advocacy" standard is the constitutional
minimum, and courts have consistently struck down or reinterpreted
regulations of political speech that overreach this standard.

42. Id. at 249 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976) (per curiam)); see,
e.g., FEC v. Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997); Faucher v. FEC, 928
F.2d 468 (Ist Cir. 1991); Maine Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8, 12 (D.
Me. 1996); see also, e.g., FEC v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm.,
616 F.2d 45, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that section 441d of the FECA "clearly establish[es] that, contrary to the position of the FEC, the words 'expressly advocating' mean[]
exactly what they say"); Right to Life of Dutchess County, Inc. v. FEC, 6 F. Supp. 2d 248,
250 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing with approval the approach of the First and Fourth Circuits in
ruling that the FEC's definition of "express advocacy" was impermissible). But see FEC v.
Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit, in the only appellate court decision that has permitted some reference to outside circumstances in evaluating whether
words constitute express advocacy, required a finding that the only reasonable interpretation of the message is that the reader or listener should vote for or against a particular
candidate. See id. at 864.
43. See, e.g., North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 713, 718 (4th
Cir. 1999) (finding a statute unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it encompassed entities engaging in issue advocacy and did not limit its coverage to entities engaging in express advocacy); Kansans for Life, Inc. v. Gaede, 38 F. Supp. 2d. 928, 936-37 (D.
Kan. 1999) (finding that the Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission's definition of "express advocacy" was unconstitutionally vague, as it reads, "a communication which, when
viewed as a whole, leads an ordinary person to believe that he or she is being urged to vote
for or against a particular candidate for office"); see also, e.g., Right to Life of Michigan,
Inc. v. Miller, 23 F. Supp. 2d 766, 771 (W.D. Mich. 1998); Planned Parenthood Affiliates of
Michigan, Inc. v. Miller, 21 F. Supp. 2d 740, 741, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (finding a state rule
"prohibit[ing] the use of a candidate's name or likeness in a communications made by a
corporation forty-five days prior to an election as "overbroad and [likely to] chill the exercise of constitutionally protected 'issue advocacy"'); Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v.
Sorrell, 19 F. Supp. 2d 204, 214 (D. Vt. 1998) (narrowly construing the term "political advertisements," as used in statutes, to mean express advocacy communications because "[i]f
the Vermont legislature intended to regulate communications that impliedly advocate for
or against a candidate, it has flouted the United States Supreme Court's holdings in
Buckley and Massachusetts Citizens For Life"); Virginia Soc'y for Human Life, Inc. v.
Caldwell, 500 S.E.2d 814, 817 (Va. 1998) (narrowing "the broad sweep of the phrase for
the purpose of influencing ... so as to have no application to individuals or groups that
engage solely in issue advocacy").
44. Maine Right to Life, 914 F. Supp. at 12.
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B. Mills v. Alabama: Thou Shalt Not Regulate Otherwise Protected
Speech Simply Because the Regulation Is Limited to Times when the
Speech Is Most Valuable
Mills and its progeny stand for the constitutional precariousness of
regulating political speech when it is most valuable: in proximity to Election Day.45 The Supreme Court in Mills addressed the constitutionality
of an Alabama statute that made it a crime to:
[D]o any electioneering or to solicit any votes or to promise to
cast any votes for or against the election or nomination of any
candidate, or in support of or in opposition to any proposition
that is being voted on the day on which the election affecting
such candidates or propositions is being held. 6
A newspaper editor who was prosecuted for violating the statute appealed the case to the United States Supreme Court.4 '7 The Court
weighed a narrow issue: whether a state can constitutionally prosecute a
newspaper editor who published an election day editorial urging people
to vote a particular way on a proposition. 4 The Court began by asserting
that a fundamental purpose of the First Amendment included protecting
the free discussion of government affairs. 49 The Court concluded that the
Alabama statute "silences the press at a time when it can be most effective" and that "no test of reasonableness can save [the] law from invalidation as a violation of the First Amendment."50
Although this decision was confined to only newspaper editorials in
non-candidate elections, lower courts have extended this ruling to create
more comprehensive election day restrictions on electioneering." The
Supreme Court of Florida further extended Mills when it struck down a
town ordinance that prohibited the publication or circulation of material
attacking political candidates within seven days of an election. 2 In so
45. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 220 (1966).
46. Id.at 216 n.2.
47. See Mills, 384 U.S. at 215-17.
48. See id. at215.
49. See id. at 21.8-19 (discussing the universal agreement on the major purpose of the
First Amendment).
50. Id. at 219-20.
51. See, e.g., National Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. McGrath, 982 F. Supp.
694, 698 (D. Mont. 1997); Gore Newspapers Co. v. Shevin, 397 F. Supp. 1253, 1258 (S.D.
Fla. 1975).
52. See Town of Lantana v. Pelczynski, 303 So. 2d 326, 327-28 (Fla. 1974). The town
of Lantana, Florida passed an ordinance, which provided:
It shall be unlawful for any candidate or other person, during seven (7) days preceding the day of any election, to publish or circulate or cause to be published or
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doing, the court addressed overbreadth difficulties and stated that the
ordinance outlawed "not only false statements but true statements as
well, those that would be'' 3helpful and fair, as well as any which might be
harmful and prejudicial.
In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court also relied upon Mills. While
invalidating FECA's $1,000 limit on independent expenditures, the Court
found that "the prohibition of election-day editorials invalidated in Mills
is clearly a lesser intrusion on constitutional freedom than a $1,000 limitation on the amount of money any person or association can spend
during an entire election year in advocating the election or defeat of a
candidate for public office. 5 4 This greater-includes-the-lesser argument
ostensibly established the one day prohibition in Mills as a baseline of
unconstitutional regulation, which fell below FECA's year-long limitation. In emphasizing that the FECA provision would limit independent
spending over the course of an entire election year, the Court indicated
its aversion to regulations that encroach upon free speech rights upon the
onset of election day.5 By referencing Mills, the Court confirms the
Mills rationale: silencing political debate at its most important time, in
day, as an unconstitutional violation of the First
proximity to5 election
6
Amendment.
IV. THE FATE OF BILLS LIMITING POLITICAL SPEECH BASED ON THE
SPEECH'S PROXIMITY TO AN ELECTION

"Never does the Constitution of the United States loom over the
regulatory projects of the [legislative and executive branches] more concirculated any charge against or attack against any candidate unless such charge
or attack has been personally served upon the candidate at least seven (7) days
prior to the day of the election, and any person failing to comply with this section
shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a violation of the code of Lantana. Any answer to a charge or attack that contains defensive matter shall not be construed
to be a charge or attack.
Pelczynski, 303 So. 2d at 326-27 (citing Lantana, Fla., Ordinance 8-20).
The Supreme Court of Florida, citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. at 219, struck down
the law as a blatant infringement on the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech and
press because the Lantana Ordinance "silences the press at a time when it can be most effective." Pelczynski, 303 So. 2d at 328. According to the court, the ordinance "outlaws
not only false statements but true statements as well, those that would be helpful and fair,
as well as any which might be harmful and prejudicial." Id. Thus, the court determined
that the ordinance exceeded constitutional bounds by sweeping too broadly.
53. Id. at 328.
54. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 50 (1976) (per curiam).
55. See id. at 50-51.
56. See id.
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spicuously than when they seek to regulate activity protected by the First
Amendment., 57 In 1798, James Madison explained the necessity of the
Constitution's looming presence over political speech in his report condemning the Sedition Act to the General Assembly of Virginia:
Let it be recollected, lastly, that the right of electing the members of the government constitutes more particularly the essence of a free and responsible government. The value and efficacy of this right depends on the knowledge of the
comparative merits and demerits of the candidates for public
trust, and on the equal freedom, consequently, of examining
and discussing
these merits and demerits of the candidates re58
spectively.
In Buckley, the Supreme Court recognized the connection between discussion of campaigns and issues when it concluded that
"[n]ot only do candidates campaign on the basis of their positions on
various public issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues of
public interest."5 9 Unsurprisingly, most citizens begin to focus on
and become engaged in political debate once election day ap60
proaches. Communications from various individuals and groups at
election time are essential to candidates, and especially incumbents,
accountable to the public. One disadvantage that incumbents face
includes answering for one's legislative voting history. Thus, if issue
advocacy was allowed to be regulated under the guise of election
proximity provisions, the electoral playing field would tilt even more
in favor of incumbents. For all of these reasons, political speech
should receive the greatest protection during the period just prior to
an election.
The county, state, and federal statutes described below fail to appreciate the fundamental role that political speech plays in our democracy.
These reform statutes magically seek to convert issue advocacy to express advocacy by looking at the speech's proximity to election day
rather than the content of the speech. In doing so, these statutes convey
the message that issue speech should occur only when the state deems it
appropriate or when it is least likely to be persuasive. 61 James Madison
57. Frank J. Sorauf, Politics, Experience, and the First Amendment: The Case of
American Campaign Finance,94 COLUM. L. REV. 1348, 1348 (1994).
58. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 n.15 (1964).
59.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42.

60. See 145 CONG. REC. S12575 (daily ed. Oct. 14,1999) (letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director, ACLU Washington Office).
61. In a metaphor employed in Buckley, "[bleing free to engage in unlimited political
expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as
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strongly believed that the health of our constitutional democracy depends upon an informed citizenry. Individuals and associations have
every right to communicate their messages when they deem it appropri62
ate and especially when the public may be listening.
A. State and County Proximity Regulations
Several states have attempted to regulate campaign advertisements by
prohibiting communications involving the identification of candidates
within a specified time period before a general or primary election.63
Without exception, the courts found these laws to be unconstitutionally4
speech.
overbroad because they inhibit issue advocacy and chill political
Should Shays-Meehan or any of the host of other federal bills with similar provisions ever be enacted into law, they would almost certainly experience a similar fate.
1. Michigan
In Planned ParenthoodAffiliates of Michigan, Inc. v. Miller," a not-forprofit corporation challenged the constitutionality of rule 169.39b(1) of
the Michigan Administrative Code, which provided:
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, an expenditure [by a
corporation or union] for a communication that uses the name
or likeness of 1 or more specific candidates is subject to the
prohibition on contributions and expenditures in section 54 of
the Act, if the communication is broadcast or distributed within
45 calendar days before the date of an election in which the

far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19 n.18.
62. Cf.FEC v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45, 53
(2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he right to speak out at election time is one of the most zealously protected [rights] under the Constitution.").
63. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2883 (1998); W. VA. CODE § 3-8-5(e), (f)
(1999); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 169.39b (1998).
64. Four federal district court opinions have rejected state laws that attempted to
regulate based on proximity to election day similar to Shays-Meehan. All four of these
opinions specifically cite Buckley and FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc. to hold
that the regulations at issue are constitutionally overbroad because they apply to political
discussion beyond "express advocacy." See Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Mich., Inc. v.
Miller, 21 F. Supp. 2d 740, 742-43, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1998); see also Right to Life of Mich.,
Inc. v. Miller, 23 F. Supp. 2d 766, 767-68, 771 (W.D. Mich. 1998); Vermont Right to Life
Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 19 F. Supp. 2d 204, 213, 215 (D. Vt. 1998), rev'd, 216 F.3d 264 (2d
Cit. 2000); West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 960 F. Supp. 1036, 1038-39, 1040, 1042
(S.D. W. Va. 1996).
65. 21 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
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66
candidate's name is eligible to appear on the ballot.
The corporation sued for injunctive relief, claiming that the rule, on its
face, violated the First Amendment. The State responded that it had a
compelling government interest in ensuring fairness in its electoral process. In addition, the State argued that the regulation was not overly burdensome because the corporation could still finance similar advertisements from separate segregated funds.67
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
enjoined the State from enforcing the rule, declaring it unconstitutionally
overbroad 68 because it went beyond regulating express advocacy and
"prohibit[ed] corporate expenditures for a wide range of issue advocacy
communications and chill[ed] constitutionally protected speech. ''69 Relying upon the distinctions between "issue advocacy" and "express advocacy" set forth in Buckley and FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life,
Inc., the court concluded that ."the same requirements imposed upon an
organization engaging in issue advocacy were imposed on an organization engaging in express advocacy, 70 and, thus, impermissibly infringed
upon constitutionally protected speech.
Accordingly, the court found the defendant's reliance on permitting
separate segregated funds to communicate during the time leading up to
the election unavailing: "While that is not an absolute restriction on
speech it is a substantial one, because to speak through a segregated fund
[the Plaintiff] must make very significant efforts to raise monies for each
and every specific issue it desires to address to the public."7'
At approximately the same time, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Michigan struck down the same rule in Right to
Life of Michigan, Inc. v. Miller.7 2 The court determined that limitations
on expenditures are valid only if they "in express terms advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office. 7 3 In
reaching this conclusion, the court stated that "Rule 169.39b applies to
all references to candidates, whether or not the reference can be con-

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 741 (quoting MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 169.39b (1998)).
See Planned ParenthoodAffiliates, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 744-45.
See id. at 746.
Id. at 743.
Id. (citing West Virginians for Life v. Smith, 960 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (S.D. W. Va

1996).
71.
72.

Id. at 745.
23 F. Supp. 2d 766,771 (W.D. Mich. 1998).

73. Id. at 767 (quoting Buckley v.Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,44 (1976) (per curiam)).
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strued as an exhortation to vote for or against the candidate. 7 4 The
court also noted several types of communications prohibited under the
rule that would otherwise be allowable, such as "articles that mention the
sponsors [of legislation], authors and supporters of specific pending bills,
identification of those who testified at hearings, and interviews with candidates."75 For these reasons, the court declared the rule to be unconstitutional.
2. Vermont
Vermont, like Michigan, attempted to regulate campaign advertisements that ran shortly before election dates. Section 2883 of Title 17 of
the Vermont Statutes Annotated required a person who makes expenditures in excess of $500 for mass media activities within thirty days of an
election to report these expenditures to the secretary of state and to the
candidate whose name or likeness appears in the advertisement.76 In
Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell,77 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit declared this statute to be unconstitutionally overbroad. 8
The Second Circuit illustrated the unconstitutionality of the statute by
listing examples of the types of advertisements that would be covered
under the law. "Under the plain terms of § 2883, for example, VRLC
would be required to report expenditures exceeding $500 on an advertisement about a law or proposal popularly known by the name of a legislator who happened to be seeking re-election., 79 In addition, "expenditures on advertisements urging people to contact a candidate, or
publicizing a news item containing the candidate's name, would have to
be reported under § 2883 even if the advertisement does not expressly
advocate the election or defeat of the candidate." ' The court
found the
81
law unconstitutional and enjoined the State from enforcing it.

74.

Id. at 768.

75.
76.

Id. at 769.
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2883 (1998).

77. 216 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'g Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell,
19 F. Supp. 2d 204 (D. Vt. 1998).
78.

See id. at 278-79.

79. Id. at 278.
80. Id.
81.

See id. at 281.
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3. West Virginia
In West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith,"2 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of West Virginia considered the constitutionality of West Virginia Code section 3-8-5(e)(1), which provided that
the publication, distribution, or dissemination of any scorecard, voter
guide, or other written analysis of a candidate's position or votes on specific issues within sixty days of an election would be considered "activity
for the purpose of advocating or opposing the nomination, election or
defeat of any candidate. 8' 3 Section 3-8-5(f) of the West Virginia Code
required those who publish, distribute, or disseminate the materials
regulated in section 3-8-5(e)(1) to include the name of the party responsible for it, otherwise such materials would be prohibited." The court
ruled that both provisions were unconstitutionally overbroad and permanently enjoined the State from enforcing them." The court found that
these provisions "impose the same requirements on an organization engaging in issue advocacy as it does on an organization engaging in express advocacy, 8 6 and unconstitutionally "presume that voter guides
constitute express advocacy if they are distributed within sixty days of an
election [.],,87
B. The Unconstitutionalityof FederalProximity Regulations
Among the bills before the Senate Rules and Administration Committee during the 10 6 " Congress were several that sought to limit political
speech near an election. As provided above, the most prominent is the
Shays-Meehan bill. Under this bill, paid advertisements that "refer" to a
clearly identified candidate and that run within sixty days before an election constitute express advocacy. Thus, just as the rule at issue in
Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Michigan, Inc. v. Miller and Right to
Life of Michigan Inc. v. Miller, Shays-Meehan appears to be unconstitutionally overbroad because it regulates advertising at certain times
merely for using the name or likeness of a candidate. Further, under
West Virginiansfor Life Inc. v. Smith, this provision would be unconstitutional because it presumes that referring to a clearly identified candidate
constitutes "express advocacy."
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

960 F. Supp. 1036 (S.D. W. Va. 1996).
W. VA. CODE § 3-8-5(e)(1) (1999).
See id. § 3-8-5(f).
See West Virginiansfor Life, 960 F. Supp. at 1042.
Id. at 1039.
Id. at 1040.
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Even without reference to the state court decisions, Supreme Court
precedence would not uphold Shays-Meehan. First, Buckley v. Valeo's
greater-includes-the-lesser framework may also be employed to strike it
down as unconstitutionally overbroad. Shays-Meehan defines "express
advocacy" as speech that refers to a clearly identified candidate within
sixty days of an election." The most compelling instance of this overbroad definition is that it completely prohibits corporations and labor organizations from engaging in these types of otherwise protected communications. 9 This flaw was particularly egregious when the Supreme
Court explicitly upheld the rights of corporations and labor unions to
conduct unlimited issue advertisements. 90 Moreover, a sixty-day ban on
the discussion of candidates is a more flagrant infringement on First
Amendment rights than the one-day ban invalidated in Mills. Finally,
the most overarching problem is that Shays-Meehan makes no attempt to
draw distinctions between express and issue advocacy. As we have seen
in cases like Buckley, FEC v. Massachusetts Citizen For Life, Inc., and
PlannedParenthood,regulations of political speech that fail to draw such
distinctions have been deemed unconstitutional.
Perhaps more problematic than the Shays-Meehan bill is the Advancing Truth and Accountability in Campaign Communications Act (SnoweJeffords), which regulates "electioneering communication" and defines
that term as:
[A]ny broadcast from a television or radio broadcast station
which"(i) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office;
"(ii) is made (or scheduled to be made) within"(I) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election
for
such Federal office; or
"(II) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a
convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to
nominate a candidate, for such Federal office; and
"(iii) is broadcast from a television or radio broadcast station
whose audience includes the electorate for such election, con-

88. H.R. 417, 106th Cong. § 201(b)(20)(A)(ii) (1999).
89. See, e.g., FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 248-49 (superimposing the "express advocacy" definition onto the corporate and labor organization
expenditure prohibitions of 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
90. See generally id. at 248-49; see also generally First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1977) (striking down a Massachusetts statute that prohibited corporate expenditures addressing referenda issues because it violated the First Amendment).
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vention, or caucus.[]91
This regulation is even more encompassing than the Shays-Meehan bill
because it applies to all communications-not just "paid advertisements"-that refer to a clearly identified candidate within sixty days of a
general election. Likewise, a bill introduced by Senators Feinstein and
Torricelli on March 22, 2000 (Feinstein-Torricelli), uses the same language as the Snowe-Jeffords bill. 92 Under the standards set forth in the
above-referenced cases, both bills would be at least as likely
as the
93
Shays-Meehan bill to be found unconstitutional by the courts.
Finally, another bill currently before the Senate Rules and Administration Committee takes a slightly different, though equally flawed, approach to regulating issue advocacy. The Clean Money, Clean Elections
Act (Wellstone-Kerry) defines the term "issue advertisement" as:
[A] communication through a broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mailing, or any
other type of general public political advertising(A) the purchase of which is not an independent expenditure or
a contribution;
(B) that contains the name or likeness of a Senate candidate;
(C) that is communicated during an election year; and
(D) that recommends a position on a political issue. 94
Creators of issue advertisements must file a report with the FEC within
forty-eight hours after disbursing the advertisement: (1) specifying the
amount of the disbursement; (2) identifying information for each person
contributing more than $5,000 to the person making the disbursement;
(3) identifying the name and address of the person making the disbursement; and (4) identifying the purpose of the issue advertisement. This
91. S. 79,106th Cong. § 2(d)(3)(A)(i)-(iii) (1999).
92. See S. 2269,106th Cong. § 3(d)(3)(A)(i)-(iii) (2000).
93. The Committee for Economic Development's campaign finance recommendations, as described in this issue, also contains a proposal to reform issue advocacy by defining express advocacy to "include communications that (1) refer to a clearly identified
federal candidate, or feature the image or likeness of a clearly identified candidate; (2)
occur within 30 days of a primary election and are targeted at the state in which the primary is occurring, or within 60 days of a general election; and (3) would be understood by
a reasonable person to be encouraging others to support or oppose that candidate."
Charles E.M. Kolb & Christopher Dreibelbis, CampaignFinance Reform: A Business Perspective, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 87, 102-03 (2000). Kolb and Dreibelbis acknowledge that
this reform would be "vigorously contested in the federal courts." Id. I agree and contend
that, based on the authorities described in this article, this reform would not withstand
First Amendment scrutiny.
94. S. 982, 106th Cong. § 303(b) (1999).

2000]

Issue Advocacy

bill attempts to be less intrusive than the other bills, but blocks out the
entire election year for its coverage of otherwise protected speech. Regardless of the nuances, it is also likely to be found unconstitutional because it seeks to redefine issue advocacy in order to regulate it.
In sum, the federal legislation pending in the Senate, which contains
election proximity provisions, may be unconstitutional. Such legislation
violates the constitutional requirement that regulations of political
speech are limited to communications expressly advocating the election
or the defeat of a clearly identified candidate.9
C. Arguments for the Constitutionalityof Regulating Issue Ads Based on
Proximity to an Election
One proponent of campaign finance reform, Glenn J. Moramarco, has
suggested two means whereby regulating based on proximity to election
day may pass constitutional muster. First, he claims that the Supreme
Court's overbreadth analysis should be governed by the more rigorous
"substantial overbreadth" standard.96 Second, Moramarco maintains that
creating a rebuttable presumption may save the constitutionality of such
a regulation, not enacting a hard and fast rule.97
Moramarco's first claim fails because substantial overbreadth, as described in the Supreme Court's decision in Broadrick v. Oklahoma,98 is
not appropriate for review of regulating political speech by proximity to
Election Day. The Broadrick Court stated that overbreadth scrutiny has
been somewhat less rigid in the context of the First Amendment; however, the application of substantial overbreadth hinges upon whether the
speech is more akin to conduct, as opposed to "pure speech," and
whether the extent of the suppression of the speech can-be predicted. 99
Both of these criteria are lacking when legislators attempt to regulate by
proximity to election day.
First, Buckley v. Valeo teaches that regulations limiting expenditures
95. Vice President Gore's current proposal is extremely broad. He "supports measures to require that all issue advertisements by special interest groups broadcast within 60
days of an election disclose their sources of funding." Gore Lieberman 2000, Al Gore's
Plan to Restore Faith in America's Democracy (last modified Oct. 1, 2000)
<http://www.algore.com/agenda/agendacfr.html>.
96. Glenn J. Moramarco, Beyond "Magic Words": Using Self-Disclosure to Regulate
Electioneering,49 CATH. U. L. REV. 107, 125 & n.105 (1999) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,610-18 (1973)).
97. See id. at 125-26 & n.106.
98. 413 U.S. 601, 610-18 (1973) (discussing the overbreadth doctrine).
99. Id. at 614-15.
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for political advocacy are not restrictions of expressive conduct, such as
those upheld in United States v. O'Brien, but are direct restraints on verbal communication.'" Therefore, the Shays-Meehan bill and its state
counterparts that directly limit expenditures for political discussion' ° '
should not be assessed for substantial overbreadth because they also
regulate beyond expressive conduct and extend into the pure speech domain. Second, the nature of regulating political speech by proximity to
election day makes the suppression of speech very predictable. The antivagueness quality of regulating expenditures for political advocacy by
reference to a specific timeframe provides the perfect indicator of the
kind of speech to be constrained and exactly when it will be circumscribed.
Buckley also renders Moramarco's suggestion of a rebuttable presumption unconstitutional. The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York (ABCNY) has adopted this suggestion to justify its recommendation that any communication, including the name or likeness of a clearly
identified candidate expressed within thirty days of an election, be presumed to be express advocacy.' 2 The ABCNY acknowledges that a
"temporal test would be overinclusive," but nevertheless believes that a
rebuttable presumption would solve the constitutional problems:
To deal with the danger of overinclusiveness, Congress should
provide that the presumption that a communication that mentions the name or includes the picture of a clearly identified
candidate within the pre-election period is election-related may
be rebutted on a showing by the speaker that based on the con100. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15-20 (1976) (per curiam). The Buckley Court stated that it could not agree with the holding in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968). The defendant in O'Brien was prosecuted for burning his draft card;
however, he claimed that the First Amendment prohibited his prosecution. O'Brien, 391
U.S. at 376. The Court, however, sustained the conviction due to the governmental interest in the nonspeech element. See id. at 376-77. The Buckley Court could not "share the
view that the present Act's contribution and expenditure limitations are comparable to the
restrictions on conduct upheld in O'Brien." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
101. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. The Shays-Meehan bill would prohibit expenditures by corporations and labor organizations. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text; see also Right to Life of Michigan, Inc. v. Miller, 23 F. Supp. 2d 766, 767
(W.D. Mich. 1998); Planned Parenthood Affiliates of Michigan, Inc. v. Miller, 21 F. Supp.
2d 740, 742 (E.D. Mich. 1998); West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 960 F. Supp. 1036,
1041 (S.D. W. Va. 1996) (prohibiting anonymous expenditures within 60 days of an election). But see Vermont Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 19 F. Supp. 2d 204, 215 (D.
Vt. 1998) (regulating only reporting requirements within 30 days of an election), rev'd, 216
F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2000), amended by 221 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2000).
102. See Dollars and Democracy: A Blueprint for Campaign Finance Reform (visited
Aug. 22, 2000) <http://www.abcny.org/dollar.html>.
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tent and context of the speech, viewers, listeners, or readers are
unlikely to treat it as an election-related communication. The
opportunity to rebut the definition of express advocacy would
raise some question of vagueness or uncertainty, but whatever
uncertainty results would be due to the law's desire to give
some extra opportunity to exempt true issue advocacy from
regulation. °3
The rebuttable presumption is not only constitutionally unsound, because it would inevitably chill protected speech, but also because it would
be a practical nightmare for those brave souls who dare speak in the
vaguely-defined land of presumed guilt.
The Buckley and Massachusetts Citizens For Life opinions, as well as
interpretive opinions of lower courts, have mandated that any existing
presumption must favor free discussion of political issues. Because the
discussion of issues and political candidates are often conflated, the Supreme Court held that limitations on expenditures can only be maintained if they entail express advocacy"3 " The district court in Maine
Right to Life Committee v. FEC understood this principle perfectly:
"What the Supreme Court did was draw a bright line that may err on the
side of permitting things that affect the election process, but at all costs
avoids restricting, in any way, discussion of public issues."'' 5 Creating a
presumption to the contrary unconstitutionally chills speech and, therefore, directly opposes the dictates of the Supreme Court.
Assuming arguendo that such a standard could withstand constitutional scrutiny, there is no way to develop a clear and workable standard
because the "distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and
advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application. "'0 The Supreme Court realizes that most advertisements
contain mixed motives. For example, Right to Life groups presumably
run ads decrying abortion and thanking candidates for their pro-life
stances because groups want to end the practice of abortion by electing
pro-life candidates.i 7 Would the presumption be rebutted by these

103. Id.
104. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42-43; FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 249 (1986).
105. Maine Right to Life Comm. v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8, 12 (D. Me. 1996), affd, 98
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996); see also FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1055
(4th Cir. 1997); Right to Life of Michigan, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 768; West Virginiansfor Life,
960 F. Supp. at 1040.
106. Maine Right to Life, 914 F. Supp. at 12.
107. Cf H.R. 417, 106th Cong. § 201(b)(20)(A)(ii) (1999).
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groups showing that their commitment to fetal life is the predominating
motive of their ads? If so, the courts must include in the legislation some
sort of qualifying language such as "primarily" or "predominantly" "election-related communications." But what kind of proof would be required to prove that the communication was not primarily an electionrelated communication?"" Are there any issues or legislation that are
completely unrelated to elections? Finally, even the true issue advocates
would find little solace in rebutting the presumption after expending substantial time and money to vindicate themselves from FEC enforcement
actions and court cases.0
V.

CONCLUSION

"Democracy depends on a well-informed electorate, not a citizenry
legislatively limited in its ability to discuss and debate candidates and issues."'' . Accordingly, although the political debates that arise during
campaign season may center around candidates, they inevitably focus on
the candidates' records on political issues and the efficacy of the issues.
Therefore, issue advertisements play a vital role in increasing accountability, debate, and public awareness. By limiting the province of government regulation to "express advocacy" and by explaining the dangers
of speech restrictions in the time leading up to election day, the Supreme
Court has successfully: (1) recognized the fundamental principles of our
democracy; (2) established the critical balance, which any campaign finance reform measure must comply, by securing the integrity of the electoral process while still protecting political speech; and (3) preordained
the fate of issue advocacy proximity regulations. Accordingly, statutes
like Shays-Meehan that seek to limit political speech as election day approaches, are constitutionally unsound, and would likely be struck down.
Rather than lament the assured proliferation of political speech, however, we should cheer the triumph of the First Amendment.

108. See, e.g., Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. at 249 (superimposing the "express advocacy" definition onto the corporate and labor organization expenditure prohibitions of 2 U.S.C. § 441b).
109. See id. at 248-49.
110. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,49 n.55 (1976) (per curiam) (emphasis added).

